The literature on network industries and network effects notes that incompatibility across rival systems can influence firms' incentives to invest in product changes that are beneficial to the consumer. We investigate this phenomenon in the case of bank ATM networks, where the number of ATM locations serves as the measure of product quality and surcharge fees serve as an index of incompatibility. Using as a natural experiment the lifting of a surcharge ban in Iowa (and not in neighboring states), we find that the associated increase in incompatibility for Iowa banks caused a substantial increase in the number of ATM locations offered to customers. This effect is found to be larger (in percentage terms) for larger banks than for smaller ones.
Introduction
The literature on compatibility in industries with network effects notes that incompatibility across systems may influence consumer welfare in two opposing directions. On the one hand, incompatibility may harm consumers by making it harder for them to derive the benefits of "mixing and matching" the components of different systems. On the other hand, it may benefit consumers if greater incompatibility causes producers to enhance their products in ways beneficial to the consumer. In this paper, we empirically examine the latter of these effects in a setting that not only allows measurement of an important dimension of product quality, but also provides an example of an exogenous shift in incompatibility that applies to some, but not all, firms in the same industry. Such a setting is provided in the case of bank investments in automated teller machine (ATMs) that are subject to regulations regarding ATM surcharging.
In the banking industry, the depositors of one institution can use their ATM cards at ATMs of other institutions. Thus ATM cards and ATMs form a system of complementary components that produce account transactions. When a depositor of one bank conducts a transaction using an ATM owned by another, the depositor may incur two fees: the so-called foreign fee, levied by the depositor's own bank, and another fee, known as a surcharge, levied by the institution that owns the ATM. These fees are typically not charged when the depositor of a bank uses his or her bank's own ATM.
Thus, these fees may be thought of, and used empirically, as indexes of the incompatibility of rival systems. Of these two fees, the surcharge is the most useful in econometric investigation, since the controversy surrounding it has resulted in differences in state regulation that allow it to be more easily instrumented.
As noted above, an increase in incompatibility may be associated with changes in product attributes that ultimately benefit the consumer. In industries with rapidly changing technologies, this may take the form of greater technological advance as a consequence of incompatibility. In the banking industry, however, this is most likely to take the form of greater investments in bank-specific ATM networks.
1 Thus, in this application, we seek to determine if incompatibility, produced by bank surcharging, yields greater investment in bank-specific ATM networks.
We also investigate in this context whether the role of incompatibility in influencing investment in bank ATM networks differs systematically with the size of the bank's network. The literature predicts that incentives for incompatibility differ across firms and will be larger for firms with larger networks, since these firms lose the competitive advantage their networks confer under compatibility. 2 Here, we investigate a related question not yet addressed empirically-whether a shift to greater incompatibility causes banks with larger networks to invest more in ATMs than do smaller banks.
The methodology employed uses a new source of data regarding ATM deployment and exploits a "natural experiment" made possible by a court decision that was handed down in March 2002. This decision, in effect, lifted a previously existing ban on ATM surcharging in the state of Iowa. Since surcharge bans in the states neighboring Iowa (and indeed in almost all states) had been lifted many years earlier, this event allows for an examination of the effect of surcharge authority on ATM deployment in a way that controls effectively for many confounding influences.
Specifically, the statistical approach employed is that of a "difference-indifference" analysis, wherein changes in bank-specific ATM deployment occurring in Iowa over a period in which its surcharge ban was lifted are compared to equivalently measured changes occurring over the same time period in neighboring states, where no change in surcharge restrictions occurred. This approach, though simple, avoids some potential problems inherent in alternative approaches employed to address this question.
Results suggest that the authority to surcharge does indeed result in deployment of more ATMs by the banking industry. Measured as the difference in the percent change in ATM locations over time, the difference appears to be substantial, particularly for the longer time period examined. We also find evidence that larger Iowa banks added more ATM locations, in percentage terms, than did smaller Iowa banks after lifting of the surcharge ban, all else equal. These results suggest that policy toward incompatibility must consider not only its direct effect on consumers, but also its effect on product attributes, which in this case is the convenience that banks offer consumers in the form of ATM networks.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature relevant to ATM deployment. Section 3 describes the nature of the difference-in-difference analysis to be employed, while section 4 discusses in more detail the model to be estimated. Section 5 describes the data, while section 6 presents the results of the analysis and discusses the possibility of a confounding effect. Section 7 concludes and summarizes.
Literature
In two recent papers, Bernhardt and Massoud use spatial models to derive several propositions relevant to ATM surcharging. In the first (Bernhardt and Massoud, 2002a) , which treats ATM deployment as exogenous, they derive several implications that are consistent with observed empirical regularities: Banks set high bank account fees for their own depositors but do not charge their own depositors for use of the bank's own ATMs; in contrast, banks charge nondepositors ATM fees (surcharges) that exceed those levels that would maximize ATM revenues from nondepositors and larger banks set higher account fees and levy higher surcharges for ATM use than smaller banks.
Of more relevance to the issue of ATM deployment, Bernhardt and Massoud (2002b) , in a second paper, develop a spatial model in which the number and location of ATMs are endogenous. They find that in equilibrium, banks over-provide ATMs because they extract profits more efficiently from bank members through bank account fees than from ATM use by depositors of other banks and because a more developed ATM network raises the attraction of establishing an account with the bank. They note that this prediction of over provision of ATMs is consistent with the observed proliferation of ATMs in recent years. Since there appears to be no incentive for a bank in their model to provide ATM services in the absence of surcharging, a positive relationship between authority to surcharge and ATM deployment appears to result trivially from their model. 1997, 1998, and 1999 , (and also including county and bank fixed effects), the coefficients of the year dummy variables are interpreted as the effect of surcharging on the deployment of ATMs. Knittel and Stango (2004) 
A "Difference-in-Difference" Analysis of the Effect of Surcharge Authority on Bank ATM Deployment
The empirical approach pursued in this paper exploits the natural experiment made possible by the very different policies toward surcharging taken by Iowa, on the one hand, and the six states neighboring Iowa, on the other. As noted above, a major event in the history of surcharging occurred on April 1, 1996, when the Cirrus and Plus 4 See Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2004, p. 7) .
national ATM networks modified their operating rules to allow ATM owners to impose surcharges. Thereafter, the incidence of surcharging rose substantially in the states represents an event surrounding which a difference-in-difference analysis can be conducted.
In assessing the results of the analysis, it will be useful to keep in mind that, in response to the lifting of a surcharge ban, the optimal levels of bank decision variables other than the surcharge or the number of ATMs deployed may also change. Banking organizations, for example, can make themselves more or less attractive to depositors by altering deposit rates and other fees, such as the foreign fee. Thus, any observed changes in ATM deployment would presumably reflect the impact of induced changes in these items as well.
The Empirical Model
The approach taken in this paper is to conduct separate comparisons of the pre- Taking the natural log of (1) and first differencing yields: Other explanatory variables to be employed in the analysis include a measure the change in the population over time of the markets in which each institution operates, a measure of the change in the number of deposit accounts of the bank over time (in some regressions), and an indicator of the extent to which the bank operates in urban areas.
The strength of this approach is that it controls for any time-invariant bank or state characteristic or for any characteristic for which the change from time t-1 to time t is the same for all observations. The choice of a sample that is restricted to one area of the country, as well as other restrictions to be discussed below, is made to take fullest advantage of this form of statistical control.
The Data
The data on bank ATM deployment were obtained from Thompson Financial
Publishing for the years 2000, 2003, and 2004 . The data set from which this information is obtained is designed to be a census of all banks, rather than simply a survey. This is particularly desirable for the purposes of this investigation, because it is, by design, restricted to one section of the country. Missing and inadequately updated data are a concern in the use of the ATM item from this data set, however, because not every institution appears to report or update regularly. These problems appear to afflict a minority of institutions covered in the data, however, and there is little reason to believe that omissions or failures to update are systematically related to surcharge status.
Nonetheless, any noise introduced in the measurement of the dependent variable by these problems would bias coefficients toward zero as a result of errors-in-variable bias. To minimize this problem, banks that report no ATMs are excluded from the analysis, since 6 The case in which a surcharge ban was in effect at the later time period but not in effect at the earlier time period and the case in which a surcharge ban was imposed in both time periods are not observed. The ATM data available from this data set refer to the number of separate ATM locations of the bank rather than the number of ATMs that the bank owns. This measure is probably more relevant to assessments of the welfare implications of surcharging, since it should be a better measure of the convenience that a bank offers its customers through its ATM deployment. In those few cases in which a merger between two banks occurred ATMs from one bank to another (or to several institutions). Because the other side of these transactions is presumably reflected in the data, these outliers are not excluded from the data set. Exclusion from the data set of all institutions reporting a change of more than five ATM locations (not reported) was found to yield results that are equivalent to those reported below, with, if anything, higher t-statistics. Data used to measure the explanatory variables employed in the analysis were obtained from the Consolidated
Reports of Condition and Income, available for each institution, the FDIC's Summary of
Deposits, which provides information on the location and total deposits of each branch of each bank in the county, and the US Census of Population.
Results
To provide an overall view of the data, Table 1 3 presents results obtained when only Iowa is used as an explanatory variable. As indicated, its coefficient is positive and barely significant at the 10 percent level.
Comparison of its magnitude with that of the constant term suggests that operation in Iowa was associated with a growth in ATM deployment that was about a third greater in
Iowa than in the neighboring states. 7 The addition of wmsa in column (2) and in column (3) indicates that operation in a metropolitan area and in a market with faster population growth was associated with faster growth in ATM deployment over this period. The addition of these variables to the regression make no material difference to the registered positive impact of operation in Iowa, consistent with the hypothesis that the lifting of the surcharge ban there (and not in neighboring states)
caused ATM deployment to increase. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine empirically the relationship between incompatibility among networks and the extent to which firms invest in improving their products.
Focusing on ATM networks in the banking industry, the measure of product quality in 9 It is more probable that growing ISO competition would retard bank ATM deployment in absolute terms.
this case is the number of ATM locations that banks offer to potential users, and the measure of incompatibility is the charge incurred by depositors to use the ATMs of another bank. The so-called surcharge, levied by the owner of the ATM in such transactions, is particularly advantageous for such an analysis, since differences in state regulation allow such an analysis to be more easily implemented.
The statistical approach employed is that of a "difference-in-difference" analysis, wherein changes in bank-specific ATM deployment occurring in Iowa over a period in which its surcharge ban was lifted are compared to equivalently measured changes occurring over the same time period in neighboring states, where no change in surcharge restrictions occurred. Results suggest that the authority to surcharge does indeed result in deployment of more ATMs by the banking industry. Measured as the difference in the percent change in ATM locations over time, the difference appears to be substantial, particularly for the longer time period examined. We also find evidence that larger Iowa banks added more ATM location, in percentage terms, than did smaller Iowa banks after lifting of the surcharge ban, all else equal. Results also reveal that operation in urban areas and operation in markets with faster population growth were positively related to bank-specific percentage increases in ATM deployment during the periods examined.
In most markets, issues of compatibility and standards are determined as competitive outcomes or by coordination within standard-setting bodies or other mechanisms. In contrast, in the case of ATM surcharging, the ability to introduce incompatibilities between banks' products is an issue of public policy. In this instance, the results reinforce the notion that policy must consider not only the direct effects of incompatibility on consumers, but also the induced effect on investment, or more generally on product quality and innovation. Number of deposit accounts of the bank at time t, employed as a measure of bank size.
acctquarti A binary variable set equal to one if the number of accounts of the banks places the bank in the ith quartile of the sample, as measured by the number of deposit accounts, and zero otherwise.
t atm
The number of ATM locations provided by the bank at time t.
wmsa The weighted average of a binary variable that receives the value of one if the bank operates in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) and zero if it operates in a county outside an MSA, where, in case the bank operates in more than one area, the share of the bank's deposits in each area serves as the weight.
t wpop
The weighted average of the population, at time t, of the market in which the bank operates, where, in case the bank operates in more than one market, the share of the bank's branches in each market serves as the weight. Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols +, *, and ** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
